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We use “real donation” laboratory experiments to compare independent fundraising, where 
donation requests from different charities arrive sequentially to potential donors, with 
collaborative fundraising, where donation requests from different charities arrive 
simultaneously. We find that collaborative fundraising generates significantly larger total 
donations compared to independent fundraising. We show that the order of requests affects 
the level of donations only in independent fundraising; in particular, participants donated 
larger amounts to charities whose requests arrived earlier. We then test whether these 
differences might be explained by the informational asymmetry between these two 
fundraising mechanisms by varying the information received by the subjects.  
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1 Introduction 
 
A considerable amount of research on charitable giving uses laboratory and field 
experiments to compare the effectiveness of different fundraising techniques (see Andreoni 
(2006), List (2011), Vesterlund (2016) for surveys). For example, Yoruk (2010) compares 
the effect of direct mailing, phone calls and TV commercials on donations. Eckel and 
Grossman (2003, 2008, 2017), List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), Karlan and List (2007), 
List (2011), and Huck and Rasul (2011) compare various types of subsidies, including 
rebates, matches or seed money.1 In addition, a growing literature focuses on competition 
among charities (e.g., Reinstein, 2011; Harwell et al. 2015; Krieg and Samek, 2017; Meer, 
2017; Deck and Murphy, 2017; Scharf et al., 2017; Filiz-Ozbay and Uler, 2018) and studies 
whether competition shifts donations among charities or whether it increases total giving.2  
 
This paper contributes to both literatures. We experimentally investigate an understudied 
fundraising technique—collaborative fundraising—by comparing it with independent 
fundraising in terms of total donations generated. In addition, for both mechanisms, we 
study whether the order in which a request is received has an effect on donations to a given 
charity. Moreover, we investigate the underlying reasons behind observed differences in 
donation behavior between mechanisms. In particular, we design treatments to test the 
effect of informational differences inherent in independent versus collaborative solicitation 
techniques in a controlled manner. 
 
In independent fundraising, charities send solicitation requests independently from each 
other and donors end up making donation decisions sequentially for different charities. 
Such independent fundraising efforts create informational uncertainty, as individuals are 
unaware of which charities will approach them next, or how many organizations may 
approach them in a given time period. When charities collaborate in their fundraising 
efforts, however, a fuller information setting is provided.  
                                                                
1 Scharf and Tonin (2018) provide a number of additional examples of tests of fundraising practices. For a study of donor 
premiums see Eckel, Herberich and Meer (2018).    
2 A related strand studies the effect of the number of charities (e.g., Andreoni, 2007; Soyer and Hogarth, 2011; Bernasconi 
et al., 2009; Corazzini et al., 2012) and optimal market structure (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1982; Bilodeau and Slivinski, 
1997; Thornton, 2006; Mungan and Yoruk, 2012; Krasteva and Yildirim, 2016) on voluntary giving. 
  
Several organizations allow charities to apply to participate in collaborative fundraising 
effort.  One example is the United Way Worldwide, which is a coalition of 1800 local 
United Way offices that pool efforts in fundraising and support. Another example is 
Alaska’s Pick-Click-Give program, which allows recipients of the Alaska’s Permanent 
Fund Dividend to donate a portion of their dividend to approved organizations. In addition, 
many states and organizations run so-called combined giving campaigns that allow 
employees to donate to organizations through payroll deductions. For all of these umbrella 
organizations, individual charitable organizations apply to be approved members of the 
coalition or campaign.3 In addition, a plethora of online platforms evaluate charities and 
facilitate contributions to different charities, such as charitynavigator.org, 
globalgiving.org, networkforgood.org, justgive.org, and onedonation.com.au. Moreover, 
we see examples of large collaborative fundraising campaigns such as #GivingTuesday.4 
All of these examples share the common element that they provide individuals with a 
chance to donate to multiple charities simultaneously (whether or not the charities take part 
in this collaboration actively).  
 
There are two informational dimensions that distinguish independent fundraising 
mechanisms from collaborative mechanisms. In independent fundraising, potential donors 
are unaware of (1) the total number of, or (2) the identities of the charities. That is, they do 
not know how many charities might request contributions, or which charities will 
subsequently approach them.  In collaborative fundraising, by contrast, donors are fully 
informed on both dimensions. 
 
The potential impact of each dimension on the pattern of giving over time and on total 
giving is unknown.  Uncertainty about the number of requests might lead a donor to hold 
back on giving to early requests, with more generous behavior reserved for later requests.  
On the other hand, a donor might give generously to early requests, exhausting her 
“budget” for charitable giving, leading to lower later donations (Thaler, 1999). Similarly 
                                                                
3 See Unitedway.org, pickclickgive.org, secctexas.org, or www.seca.pa.go for examples.   
4 #GivingTuesday is a global campaign which started in 2012. It generated more than $180 million in donations online 
in a single day in 2016 to benefit a broad range of causes. 
See https://www.givingtuesday.org/lab/2017/07/givingtuesday-insight-report-2017.   
  
for total donations, a donor might end up giving more or less in total. Total donations might 
be lower in independent fundraising, if individuals save part of their charitable budget 
waiting for a “better” charity to show up later (and one never does). Alternatively, total 
donations might be higher in independent fundraising, if individuals feel they need to 
donate when a new donation request arrives with an unexpected worthy cause even if they 
have already donated large amounts early on. A salient example is the efforts in 2017 to 
raise funds for victims of Hurricane Harvey in Texas and of Hurricane Irma in Florida and 
the Caribbean islands. Donors may have given generously for Harvey, which may have 
reduced their gifts for Irma, or donors may have ended up giving more in total than they 
planned in response to the surprise occurrence of Irma. 5  The philanthropy literature 
provides little guidance as to which outcome we might predict when comparing 
collaborative and independent fundraising mechanisms. In our study, we aim to both (a) 
compare performances of these mechanisms in generating donations, and (b) to shed light 
on how both types of informational uncertainty impact donation behavior in each 
mechanism separately. 
 
Although we encounter both collaborative and independent fundraising efforts in real life, 
the relative performance of these two different mechanisms is not well understood (Abdy 
and Barclay, 2001). The difference between the two mechanisms is difficult to test using 
observational data, because charities do not often engage in both strategies simultaneously, 
and many factors change between instances of the two.6 In addition, the data that would be 
needed to isolate the role of information on donations in a field setting are simply not 
available. Our paper, on the other hand, provides the first systematic analysis of whether 
collaborative fundraising can increase overall giving in a society by overcoming 
                                                                
5 While not in the context of multiple charities, a related example is provided by Cairns and Slonim (2011). They look at 
the substitution effects of the presence of 2nd collections on 1st collections at Catholic Masses and find a negative effect 
on 1st donations and a positive effect on total donations. In addition, there is recent literature on how natural disasters 
affect total donations (e.g., Deryugina and Marx (2015) and Scharf et al. (2015)). Note that our paper studies a different 
question. We compare two different fundraising mechanisms where the identity of charities and the number of requests 
are exactly the same. 
6 For example, different fundraising methods might occur at very different times which would imply income available 
for donation might differ between these different methods. One needs to carefully isolate the effect of fundraising 
technique from that of differing income (as well as other confounds). Moreover, charities that engage in collaborative 
fundraising may have different characteristics from charities that engage in independent fundraising, and the direct effect 
of collaborative solicitation is hard to disentangle. In an experimental set-up one can control for all factors other than the 
ones under consideration. 
  
informational problems that might arise with independent fundraising efforts.7 By using 
real donations in a lab setting, we can control all other factors that might constitute 
confounds, and experimentally test the difference in the two mechanisms holding 
everything else (including the identity of charities and the number of requests) constant. 
Furthermore, in a laboratory experiment, we can exogenously vary the level of information 
and isolate its effect on donations.   
 
We conduct a laboratory experiment where subjects make actual donation decisions to 
eight charities under both independent fundraising, where the donation requests arrive 
sequentially without prior information about either the total number or identity of the 
charities, and collaborative fundraising where donation requests arrive simultaneously, 
with information about both the number and identity of the charities. We further conduct 
two additional treatments that allow us to identify the effects of uncertainty about the 
number and identity of charities separately. In addition, we also introduce a payoff-relevant 
surprise phase which gives subjects the opportunity to revise their donation decisions. We 
investigate whether and how subjects update their initial donations under different 
fundraising mechanisms in our treatments. Finally, we elicit emotions subjects experienced 
while donating, subjects’ attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, and demographics, and 
incorporate these into our analyses as controls.  
 
We find that the collaborative fundraising mechanism outperforms the independent one in 
total donations generated. When full information regarding the number and identity of 
charities is given to subjects prior to the sequential arrival of any requests, there remains 
no significant difference in total donations as compared to collaborative fundraising. 
Therefore, potential donors’ lack of information turns out to be the reason behind the poorer 
performance of independent fundraising relative to collaboration. We also study whether 
the order of a request (i.e., early versus late) matters in terms of donations collected for an 
individual charity. We see that order has an effect only in the independent fundraising 
technique: early requests generate higher donations on average. When individuals are 
                                                                
7 While writing this paper, we came across a related working paper, Vance-McMullen (2017), which also compares 
simultaneous and sequential fundraising campaigns experimentally, but does not study the role of information. Our papers 
complement one another, and we return to a discussion of this paper in the conclusion. 
  
provided with prior information regarding how many solicitation requests they will receive, 
the order effect disappears. When subjects are offered a surprise opportunity to revise their 
donations to all charities, subjects in all treatments increase donations.  The amount of the 
update is highest under independent fundraising, though it is not large enough to increase 
donations to the levels seen in collaborative fundraising. Our results are robust to 
controlling for emotions, risk and ambiguity attitudes as well as demographics.  
  
Our study differs from the literature on united charities (Ghosh et al. 2007; Bilodeau, 1992). 
A united charity refers to a centralized fundraising effort where small charities are unified 
under the same umbrella and the total revenue is distributed among the members of the 
united charity, typically according to a fixed rule. By contrast, in a collaborative 
fundraising effort of the form we study, multiple charities that are completely independent 
from each other fundraise simultaneously (i.e., a pool of potential donors is provided with 
a list of charities so that individuals can decide how much to donate to each specific charity 
at the same time). As such, our collaborative treatment more closely resembles state 
combined campaigns or Alaska’s Pick Click Give program than the United Way. 
 
The findings of the current paper are relevant from both academic and policy perspectives.  
To our knowledge, we are the first study to systematically examine the role of information 
on the performance of these two different fundraising mechanisms. Our paper shows that 
under full information, how charitable requests are presented (simultaneous versus 
sequential) by itself does not matter for the amount of charitable donations attracted; that 
is, charitable sector cannot affect the charitable pie by just changing how the requests will 
be presented. On the other hand, if individuals are not fully informed regarding the 
upcoming requests, then collaborative fundraising helps donations increase by eliminating 
two primary sources of uncertainty present in the independent fundraising. While it is very 
difficult to disentangle the effectiveness of collaborative and independent fundraising using 
observational data, our results demonstrate the effectiveness of full collaboration over full 
independent fundraising in a laboratory setting.  
 
  
From a policy perspective, our results constitute an initial step in demonstrating that 
charities would benefit from increased participation in collaborative fundraising 
mechanisms. In the field, eliminating all uncertainties via collaborative fundraising 
mechanisms akin to those studied in this experiment might not be possible. In fact, we do 
not expect all charities to restrict themselves to collaborative fundraising (that is, outside 
the lab, collaborative fundraising requests might still be accompanied by additional 
requests sent independently from other non-participating charities).  In this paper, in order 
to disentangle the relative effectiveness of collaborative and independent fundraising and 
to understand the role of information, we focus on two extreme scenarios on purpose. Our 
results provide a foundation upon which further lab or field experiments might build.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the experimental 
design. Section 3 presents our main findings. Section 4 concludes. Additional analyses and 
instructions are provided in the Appendices.  
 
2 Experimental Design 
 
We conducted a computer-based experiment at the experimental laboratory of Ozyegin 
University (OzU) in Turkey during March-May 2017. The computer program was coded 
using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited via Sona Systems from the 
participant pool at OzU. A total of 187 subjects participated in our experiment.8  
 
There were eight experimental sessions. Instructions were read aloud to ensure that each 
subject was exposed to complete instructions and that they did not skip any parts.  
Throughout the experiment, Turkish Lira (TL) was used.9 Each subject was paid a show-
up fee of 10 TL, and given the chance to earn additional monies during the experiment. 
The average total payment per subject across all sessions was 32.5 TL (excluding their 
donations to the charities). At the end of each experimental session, subjects received their 
payments in private. The entire process lasted approximately 60 minutes. After all of the 
                                                                
8 Our subjects are experienced with charitable giving in general. At Ozyegin University where we ran our experimental 
sessions, charitable events take place. Students participate in such events by donating goods (such as books, toys etc.) to 
kids in need and taking part in voluntary activities such as working at the university’s animal shelter.  
9 At the time of the experiment, the average exchange rate was about $1=3.55 TL. 
  
eight experimental sessions were over, we sent the total donations to the charities used in 
the study on behalf of the subjects.  
 
The experiment is composed of six parts. In Parts 1 and 3, subjects make decisions 
regarding real donations to charitable organizations. We selected eight charities in Turkey, 
each operating in a different area: the environment, animals, violence against women, 
search and rescue, cancer, education, homeless people, and art.10 The order in which the 
donation requests for the charities were presented was randomized for each subject at the 
outset of the experiment. To ensure that order did not play a role in a given subject’s 
decisions within different parts of the experiment, the order of charities was fixed 
throughout the experiment for each subject. In Part 2, subjects are asked to indicate feelings 
they experienced during their donation decisions in Part 1. In Parts 4 and 5, they are given 
tasks designed to reveal their attitudes towards ambiguity and risk, respectively. In Part 6, 
they fill out a questionnaire.  
 
In Part 1, subjects start with an endowment of 50 TL provided by the experimenters, make 
real donations to charities out of their endowment, and keep the remaining amount as part 
of their earnings from the experiment. 11  Individuals are asked to make one donation 
decision for each charity. For each treatment, since there are eight charities, subjects make 
eight donation decisions in total. We use a between-subjects design with four treatments. 
One dimension of variation across our treatments is the way subjects receive donation 
requests. In the SIM Treatment, subjects receive all donation requests simultaneously. A 
table with the names and short descriptions of eight charities is shown to subjects. They 
are asked to decide how much to donate to each charity and submit their donation decisions 
to all charities at once.  Subjects participating in the SIM treatment make all their donation 
decisions knowing the number and identity of all charities in the experiment. We consider 
the SIM treatment in our experiment as representing a collaborative fundraising effort in 
real life.  
 
                                                                
10 This is also in line with different major groups in the NTEE-CC classification system. 
11 In 2017, the opportunity cost of students in our subject pool was approximately 7 TL per hour, and therefore 50 TL is 
a substantial amount for our subject pool. In addition, daily minimum wage in Turkey in 2017 was 59.25 TL. 
  
The next three treatments have a SEQ component, indicating that donation requests arrive 
sequentially. In these treatments, donation decisions are made one at a time: subjects are 
provided with the name and a short description of a particular charity and asked to decide 
how much to donate to that specific charity. Only after they submit their donation decision 
for that particular charity does the next donation request from a different charity arrive 
(subjects are not allowed to go back and modify their earlier decisions within Part 1). We 
call each of these donation requests a “stage”.   
 
In treatments with a SEQ component, we also vary the level of information that subjects 
possess at the time they submit a donation decision. In the SEQ-NOINFO Treatment, 
subjects know nothing in advance about the total number of donation requests to arrive or 
the identity of the charitable organizations from which they will receive requests. They 
find out the identity of a charity only when a specific request arrives. We consider the SEQ-
NOINFO Treatment as representing an independent fundraising effort in real life. In the 
SEQ-LOWINFO Treatment, subjects know in advance that they will receive donation 
requests from eight charities in total, while they do not know in advance from which 
charities specifically they will receive donation requests. Subjects find out the identity of 
a charity when a request from that charity arrives. In the SEQ-FULLINFO Treatment, 
subjects are first provided with a table including the names and short descriptions of all 
eight charities they will face when the donation stages start. After they examine this 
information table, they move on to the donation stages in which requests arrive one at a 
time. Note that while treatments SIM and SEQ-FULLINFO differ in the way the requests 
arrive, the information structure of these two treatments is exactly the same, as subjects 
know both the total number of forthcoming donation requests and the identity of all 
charities in the experiment prior to making all their donation decisions. 
  
On the donation screens of all treatments, subjects are shown: (1) their current endowment, 
and (2) the amount of money they keep for themselves following their intended donations. 
The current endowment information indicates the total amount of money a subject has for 
  
donations in the current donation screen and the forthcoming ones, if there are any.12 To 
see the amount of money subjects keep for themselves after their intended donations, 
subjects need to type their donation decision(s) in the current screen and press the 
“calculate” button, and they are shown the difference between their current endowment 
and the total donations they enter in the current screen.13 Before actually submitting their 
donation decisions, subjects are allowed to calculate this amount under various donation 
decisions as many times as they like. The aim of providing such information to subjects is 
to decrease the likelihood that they make calculation errors and to prevent any potential 
differences that might arise in the data due to variations in the computational demands of 
each treatment (i.e., the SIM treatment has only one stage with eight donation decisions 
made simultaneously, while other treatments have eight stages each with a single donation 
decision).14  
 
Regardless of the specific treatment a subject has experienced in Part 1, all the remaining 
parts (2-6) of the experiment are exactly the same for all subjects. Motivated by the 
considerable amount of attention emotions have received in the charitable giving literature 
(i.e., Andreoni, 1989, 1990; O’Keefe and Figge, 1997; Andreoni, 2006; Van Diepen et al. 
2006, 2009a; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Andreoni et al., 2011; Gneezy et al., 2012; Fiala and 
Noussair, 2017), we elicit information regarding subjects’ emotions in Part 2. In order to 
isolate the role of information, we study the extent to which different fundraising 
mechanisms lead to different emotions. Subjects are provided with a list of feelings in a 
random order (happiness, shame, pride, sadness, guilt, irritation, excitement, nervousness, 
surprised, regret) and asked to indicate which ones they have experienced during Part 1 
where they have made donation decisions. They are also allowed to type feelings that are 
                                                                
12 For the SIM treatment, the current endowment shows 50 TL, as there is only one donation screen in which all the 
donations are made at once. For the other three treatments in which donation requests arrive sequentially, the current 
endowment is 50 TL in the first donation stage, and in subsequent stages, 50 TL minus the sum of total donations made 
in the previous stages (if any). 
13 In the SIM treatment, the sum of donations entered for multiple charities simultaneously is subtracted from the current 
endowment, whereas in treatments with a SEQ component, a single donation entered for the specific charity at the current 
stage is subtracted from the current endowment.  
14 It is possible that, outside our controlled environment, individuals make such calculation mistakes (or forget their 
previous donations), which might create additional differences between simultaneous and sequential fundraising. By 
providing a way to eliminate or minimize such mistakes in our experiment, we are able to isolate the role of information 
in explaining the differences between these fundraising methods. 
  
not on the list. This part of the experiment not only enables us to control for subjects’ 
emotions in our analyses, but also serves as a filler between Part 1 and Part 3. 
 
Part 3 is another novel component of our experimental design. It consists of a payoff-
relevant surprise question. Subjects are provided with a table specifying the identity and 
descriptions of the charities they have encountered in Part 1 and their own donations to 
each charity there. They are asked whether and how they would like to update their earlier 
decisions. For each charity in the table, subjects are asked to type a “final donation 
decision” and then submit all final decisions at once. A final donation decision for a charity 
could be the same amount as the earlier decision the subject has made in Part 1 or a different 
amount if he/she is now willing to change the earlier decision. Subjects are told that only 
their final donation decisions will be taken into account when we calculate their earnings 
from the experiment and send donations to charities. On the screen of this part, subjects 
are again provided with the information regarding their current endowment and the amount 
of money they will keep for themselves if they submit the final donation decisions they 
have just entered. Additionally, the amount of money they will keep for themselves if they 
do not change their earlier donations is also shown to them on the screen. The vitality of 
Part 3 lies in it coming as a surprise: subjects have decided about their donations in Part 1 
without knowing that they will be given the opportunity to revise their choices in Part 3. 
This surprise feature allows us to observe whether and how subjects update their decisions 
after they have been exposed to different treatments in Part 1.  
 
The purpose of Parts 4 and 5 in this experiment is to elicit subjects’ attitudes towards 
ambiguity and risk, respectively. We later use these attitudes as controls in the analyses of 
subjects’ donation decisions across different treatments. In Part 4, based on Charness et al. 
(2013), we use a variant of an Ellsberg experiment, wherein each subject is asked to 
consider six containers, each containing a total of 100 balls with colors red, blue, and green. 
Subjects are told the exact number of red balls and the total number of blue and green balls 
in each container. They are not told the exact number of blue balls or the exact number of 
green balls. The first container has 50 red balls and 50 blue and green balls. The second 
container has 40 red balls and 60 blue and green balls, while the sixth container has 0 red 
  
balls and 100 blue and green balls. For each container, they are asked to bet on the color 
of a randomly selected ball. To determine a subject's earnings from Part 4, one container is 
randomly selected and a subject receives 5 TL upon correctly guessing the color of a 
randomly selected ball from that container, and 0 TL otherwise. The outcome is revealed 
to subjects after they complete all parts of the experiment. Our measure of ambiguity 
aversion is based on the total number of red ball choices. 
 
In Part 5, we use a variant of a multiple price list technique in order to elicit the certainty 
equivalent of a risky lottery (e.g., Schubert et al. (1999), Barr and Packard (2002) and 
Harrison and Rustrom (2008)). Subjects are asked to make choices in six situations, each 
involving a lottery and a certain amount of money. The lottery is always the same (50-50 
chance of earning 5 TL or 1 TL) while the certain amount of money varies from 1 TL up 
to 3.5 TL (with an increment of 0.5 TL) across all six situations. Subjects are asked to 
decide whether they prefer the lottery or the certain amount in each of the six situations. 
One situation from Part 5 is randomly selected at the end of the experiment and the subject 
is paid according to the choice he/she has made in that situation. We use the number of 
safe choices as a measure of risk aversion. 
 
Finally, in Part 6, subjects fill out a questionnaire about their liking and prior knowledge 
of charitable organizations in the experiment, their overall donations in the last 12 months, 
the importance of religion in their life, demographics, etc. Then, each subject privately 
receives his/her payment, calculated as the sum of the 10 TL show-up fee and the amount 
of the endowment the subject has not donated in Part 3 (50 TL – subject’s total final 
donations in Part 3) and the subject’s earnings from Parts 4 and 5. 
 
We have three main hypotheses we wish to investigate with our experiment. First, we ask 
whether donations in the SIM and SEQ-NOINFO differ. A case can be made that donations 
will be larger or smaller with collaborative fundraising. If donors give generously to early-
arriving charitable requests, and later receive solicitation from unexpected but worthy 
causes, then total donations would be higher under independent than under collaborative 
fundraising.  On the other hand, independent fundraising may lead donors to hold back 
  
their giving to early-arriving requests, anticipating that an attractive opportunity may arrive 
later. In this case, donations could be lower with independent fundraising. Therefore, while 
we hypothesize that donation behavior will differ between the two mechanisms, we do not 
presume a direction for the difference. Second, if donations differ, is this because of 
informational asymmetries across mechanisms? In other words, if donors are provided with 
full information in advance regarding the number and the identity of the charities, would 
the gap between sequential and simultaneous solicitation methods disappear? Our 
hypothesis is that there is no difference in total donations among SIM and SEQ-
FULLINFO treatments. Third, if information is important, is the information about the 
number or identity of organizations most relevant? In particular, we test (i) whether the 
total donations between SEQ-NOINFO and SEQ-LOWINFO differ, (ii) whether total 
donations between SEQ-NOINFO and SEQ-FULLINFO differ. We examine these 
questions and test our hypotheses in Section 3.1. 
 
In addition to our main hypotheses, we also explore whether and how early versus late 
requests have an effect on donations for an individual charity under each treatment. This 
gives us additional insight into understanding the two mechanisms. Note that in the SIM 
treatment all donation requests are presented on the same screen, but it is possible that 
being at the top of the list or at the bottom of the list might matter for donations collected 
at the individual charity level. Having said that, we expect to have a larger effect of early 
versus late requests in the SEQ-NOINFO treatment, since subjects do not know the number 
of requests to come or the identities of the forthcoming charities. Whether donations will 
increase or decrease with upcoming requests is an open question. Section 3.2 addresses this 
topic. 
 
Finally, in Part 3 of our experiment, we also investigate whether and how subjects revise 
their earlier donation decisions. Subjects in the SEQ-NOINFO and SEQ-LOWINFO may 
realize that they have made incorrect (suboptimal) decisions in Part 1 due to absent 
information and therefore, they may improve their giving decisions in Part 3 when they are 
fully informed. While subjects in all treatments may revise their donations also for reasons 
not related to information, we conjecture the largest amount of revisions to happen in the 
  
SEQ-NOINFO treatment where subjects are not provided with any information (regarding 
the total number of charities and the identities of subsequent charities) in advance. Section 
4 will discuss alternative explanations for revisions and will test the hypothesis that largest 
revisions are observed in the SEQ-NOINFO treatment.  
 
For each treatment, we initially planned to recruit 50 subjects. Due to different show-up 
rates, the actual number of participants in each treatment ranged from 42 to 54. The power 
of our study to find a 10 TL (7.5 TL) difference in total donations at the 5% significance 
level between SIM and SEQ-NOINFO treatments is approximately 0.89 (0.67).15  
 
3 Main Findings 
 
In this section, we focus on donations made in Part 1 of the experiment. In Section 3.1, we 
study total donations (the sum of donations to eight charities). In Section 3.2, we 
concentrate on donations to individual charities and study whether they are affected by the 
order of requests. 
 
3.1 Total Donations in Part 1 
 
The first question we study is whether there is any difference in total donations between 
the collaborative (SIM) and independent fundraising (SEQ-NOINFO) mechanisms. The 
answer is, yes. Table 1 shows the mean and median total donations to all eight charities (as 
well as standard errors in parentheses) for Part 1 of all treatments. The mean (median) 
donation in SIM is 35.75 (40) while the mean (median) donation in SEQ-NOINFO is 25.95 
(25). Relative to the SEQ-NOINFO treatment, donations are about 38 percent larger in the 
SIM treatment. A Mann-Whitney test shows that the difference in total donations between 
these two treatments is statistically significant at the 1% significance level (see Table 2).16  
                                                                
15 Reported power analysis relies on the assumption that donations have a standard deviation of 15. 
16 Out of 187 subjects, only 4 subjects made zero donations in total. Note that, surprisingly, 42 out of 187 subjects donated 
all of their endowment of 50 TL.  While house money effect and cultural differences might partly explain this high 
generosity, they should not affect treatments differently. In contrast, we find that 18 of these subjects are from SIM 
treatment, 11 of these subjects are from SEQ-FULLINFO, 9 of these subjects are from SEQ-LOWINFO and only 4 
subjects are from SEQ-NOINFO. In other words, different fundraising mechanisms lead to different generosity levels. 
This also leads to an important observation. Since SIM treatment induces more subjects to become constrained by their 
  
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Total Donations in Part 1 No. of obs. 




















Table 2. Pairwise Comparisons of Total Donations in Treatments in Part 1 
 SEQ-NOINFO SEQ-LOWINFO SEQ-FULLINFO 
SIM 0.00 0.04 0.15 
SEQ-NOINFO  0.40 0.04 
SEQ-LOWINFO   0.36 
Each cell reports p-values associated with the Mann-Whitney Tests. 
 
Further evidence on the comparison between these treatments can be obtained via OLS 
regression analyses (presented in Table 3). The dependent variable in our regressions is the 
total donation a subject makes in Part 1. The independent variables in Regression (1) are 
the dummies for treatments SIM, SEQ-LOWINFO and SEQ-FULLINFO where SEQ-
NOINFO is left out as the base category. Once more we see that donations are significantly 
higher in the SIM treatment compared to the SEQ-NOINFO treatment at the 1% 
significance level. 
 
 We now ask whether the observed differences in donations among treatments could be 
due to different mechanisms generating different emotions. In Appendix A.1, we analyze 
whether the likelihood of experiencing certain emotions is statistically significantly 
different across treatments. We observe very little difference. In fact, none of the emotions 
                                                                
endowments compared to SEQ-NOINFO treatment, we would expect the SIM treatment to generate even larger donations 
relative to the SEQ-NOINFO treatment if our subjects were not constrained by their endowment. In other words, the 
difference we observe could be a lower-bound for the actual difference.  
  
are statistically significantly different between SEQ-NOINFO and SIM treatments (see 
Appendix A.1 for further details). Nevertheless, it is important to control for emotions in 
our regression analyses to make sure the differences in donations still persist. Similarly, in 
order to isolate the effect of information on donations, it is important to control for risk and 
ambiguity preferences as well as demographics (see Appendix A.2 and A.3 for detailed 
analysis on these topics). In Regression (2) of Table 3, we control for emotions (elicited in 
Part 2), as well as ambiguity (elicited in Part 4) and risk attitudes (elicited in Part 5), 
demographics and other related variables (questionnaire – Part 6). Regression (2) shows 
that the difference in donations among treatments SIM and SEQ-NOINFO still persists 
(and, in fact, becomes even stronger) when these controls are included. 17  These 
observations lead to our first main result. 
 
Result 1. Total donations generated via collaborative fundraising (SIM) are significantly 
higher than those raised in independent fundraising (SEQ-NOINFO). 
 
Table 3. OLS Regressions with and without control variables (for Part 1) 
Dep. Var : 
TotalDonationPart1 
(1) (2) 
sim 9.80*** 10.92*** 
 (3.23) (3.26) 
seq-lowinfo 2.96 3.08 
 (3.39) (3.43) 
seq-fullinfo 6.44** 7.72** 
 (3.04) (3.55) 
constant 25.95*** 7.73 
 (2.18) (24.47) 
Controls added NO YES 
N 187 187 
R2 0.05 0.28 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** 
at 5%, and *** at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
                                                                
17 Since most of the control variables turn out to be statistically insignificant, we do not show the controls in Table 3 to 
simplify the presentation. A detailed analysis of control variables is presented in Appendices A1-A3, where we study the 
correlation of donations with emotions, ambiguity and risk attitudes, and the variables from the questionnaire. 
  
Next, our aim is to understand whether the difference in donations between collaborative 
and independent fundraising mechanisms could be due to different levels of information 
potential donors possess at the time they decide about their donations. Recall that 
independent fundraising (SEQ-NOINFO) is associated with subjects’ lack of information 
about the identity and the number of charities prior to their donation decisions whereas a 
full information structure is present in collaborative fundraising (SIM). We now analyze 
the impact of prior information on total donations, specifically whether information can be 
a reason for why collaborative fundraising outperforms independent fundraising in 
attracting donations.  
 
Table 2 shows p-values associated with Mann-Whitney tests for all pairwise comparisons. 
One may think the reason behind donations being lower in the SEQ-NOINFO relative to 
the SIM treatment is that individuals do not know how many donation requests they will 
receive. Interestingly, Table 2 shows that total donations in treatments SEQ-NOINFO and 
SEQ-LOWINFO are not significantly different from each other. This is confirmed through 
the regression analyses, in Table 3 (in which the coefficient on SEQ-LOWINFO is 
insignificant). Hence, revealing only the number of requests in advance does not result in 
any significant change in total donations when requests arrive sequentially. On the other 
hand, revealing the identity of charities from which sequential requests to arrive does make 
a difference. According to Table 2, total donations increase from SEQ-NOINFO to SEQ-
FULLINFO, and this increase is statistically significant at the 5% level. Table 3 provides 
additional evidence, at the 5% significance level, that total donations in SEQ-FULLINFO 
are higher than the total donations in SEQ-NOINFO (even when emotions, ambiguity and 
risk attitudes, as well as other related factors from the questionnaire are controlled for). 
Moreover, as depicted in Table 2, between Treatments SIM and SEQ-FULLINFO where 
the information structure is the same, the difference in donations is not statistically 
significant. Result 2 summarizes these findings and leads us to the conclusion that full 
information is the main driver behind the collaborative fundraising mechanism’s (SIM) 




Result 2. Providing partial information (regarding the number of charitable requests) does 
not lead to higher total donations when requests arrive sequentially, but providing full 
information significantly increases total donations. As long as full information is possessed 
at the time donation decisions are made, total donations do not significantly change 
depending upon whether requests arrive sequentially or simultaneously.  
 
3.2 Does the Order of Requests Matter for Donations to Individual Charities? 
 
Our previous analyses focus on total donations to understand how different fundraising 
mechanisms affect the charitable sector as a whole. We now study the relationship between 
the order of requests (early versus late arrival) and donations to individual charities in each 
fundraising mechanism.18 Note that, for the SIM treatment, early (late) corresponds to 
being at the top (bottom) of the list. For all the other treatments, early (late) request means 
donation request received at an early (late) stage. Analyzing whether and how this 
relationship varies with different fundraising mechanisms could also shed light on why 
these mechanisms differ in attracting donations.  
 
Figure 1 shows the mean donations to individual charities for each order under each 
treatment. We see that donations to early requests do not differ much between the SEQ-
NOINFO and SIM treatments.19 In contrast, late requests in the SEQ-NOINFO treatment 
generates much lower donations compared to the SIM treatment. While we observe a 
significant order effect in the SEQ-NOINFO treatment, we do not observe order effect in 
the other treatments. Controlling for the identity of the charities as well as other variables 
that might influence donation decisions, we run OLS regressions (not shown here), 
separately for each treatment and find that the order of requests matters only for the SEQ-
NOINFO treatment and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. For treatments 
                                                                
18 This section reports our results on donations to individual charities. We have also studied whether different treatments 
lead to different fraction of positive donations. We do not see any significant differences at the extensive margin (see 
Appendix B). 
19 In fact, when we regress donations on treatment dummies taking into account only the early donations, we find that 
none of the treatment dummies are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Alternatively, an OLS regression 
(not shown here) with treatment dummies as well as interactions of these dummies with the “order” of requests confirm 
that early donations in the SEQ-NOINFO treatment are not significantly different than early donations in any of the other 
treatments. 
  
SIM, SEQ-NOINFO, SEQ-LOWINFO and SEQ-FULLINFO, p-values are 0.88, 0.00, 0.29 
and 0.14, respectively.20  
 
Given that the order of requests does not have a significant impact on donations to 
individual charities in treatments SIM, SEQ-LOWINFO and SEQ-FULLINFO, one can 
conclude that in these fundraising mechanisms, it does not really matter where a charity is 
presented in the donation stage(s). In the SEQ-NOINFO treatment, however, we see a 
strong effect related to the order of solicitation arrival: subjects donate large amounts to 
early arrivals (similar to donation levels in the SIM treatment), but then their donations 
drop rapidly (especially after the 3rd request).  
 
 
                                                                  Figure 1 
 
Next, we compare the SEQ-NOINFO and SEQ-LOWINFO treatments to gain insight on 
whether partial information has an impact on donation behavior at all. Remember that these 
two treatments differ only in the information available to subjects regarding the number of 
charities: in the SEQ-LOWINFO treatment, subjects know the number of charities in 
                                                                
20 Our analysis here controls for the identity of the charities. To see how donations differ among different charities, see 
Table B.1 in Appendix B. Note that our aim in this subsection is not to study the order effect of different causes. Our 
experimental design ensures that this order is randomized for each subject. Instead, we aim to study the effect of early 
versus late solicitation requests on generated donations controlling for the identity of charities. Since the order of charities 













SIM SEQ-NOINFO SEQ-LOWINFO SEQ-FULLINFO
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
  
advance whereas in the SEQ-NOINFO, they do not. Even though total donations attracted 
do not differ significantly across these treatments, how subjects respond to individual 
requests differs significantly. While we observe a significant order effect in SEQ-NOINFO, 
order effect is absent in the SEQ-LOWINFO. Knowing the number of requests to come in 
advance, subjects in the SEQ-LOWINFO donate evenly over them. 
 
Result 3. A significant order effect of solicitation requests is present only in the SEQ-
NOINFO treatment, where donations to early requests are large and then drop rapidly in 
later stages.   
 
Result 3 shows that the number of upcoming requests influences the distribution of total 
donations. When the number is known in advance, subjects allocate their total donations 
more evenly across individual charities and the order of requests becomes unimportant. 
Moreover, this result also suggests that charities that perform collaborative fundraising do 
not need to worry about the order in which their charity is listed on the donation page. 
 
 4 Additional Findings 
 
In this section, we study whether and how subjects update the donation amounts they have 
chosen in Part 1 of the experiment when they are given a chance to revise them in Part 3. 
In line with our main analyses, we first focus on total donations and then study order effects 
by examining donations to individual charities. 
 
4.1 Revised Total Donations 
 
In Part 3 of the experiment, subjects are presented with a screen that shows the donation 
decisions they have made in Part 1 for each of the eight charities and are asked to enter 
their revised donation decisions on the same screen simultaneously. The aim of Part 3 is 




There might be several reasons why subjects may want to revise their donation decisions.21 
Subjects might revise their donations just because they are asked to (i.e., experimenter-
demand effect). Another possibility is that asking for emotions between Parts 1 and 3 may 
have played a role. When we ask subjects in Part 2 to think about the emotions they felt 
during Part 1, some indicated that they felt guilt, pity, sadness, etc. Being encouraged to 
think about their emotions and given a chance to revise their donations right after might 
lead subjects to increase their donations while revising. These two factors are present in all 
treatments and therefore they are expected to influence all treatments similarly. A third 
possible reason for the revisions could be the absent prior information. This factor is 
present only in treatments SEQ-NOINFO and SEQ-LOWINFO and, hence, it is expected 
to yield different revision amounts across treatments. We conjecture, among all four 
treatments, the largest amount of revisions to happen in the SEQ-NOINFO treatment where 
subjects are not provided with any information (regarding the total number of charities and 
the identities of subsequent charities) in advance. 
 
Table 4 shows the mean and median of revised total donations to all eight charities as well 
as standard errors in parentheses for all treatments. Comparing total donations in Part 1 
(Table 1) and the revised total donations in Part 3 (Table 4) shows an increase in total 










                                                                
21 Given our Result 2 and the fact that all subjects have reached the same full information level by the beginning of Part 
3, the revisions in SEQ treatments cannot be attributed to the simultaneous donation structure in Part 3. 
22 The surprise question in our design allows subjects to revise their donations downward as well. The majority of subjects 
are observed to revise upwards, not downwards.   
  
Table 4. Summary Statistics for Revised Total Donations in Part 3 
 Revised Total Donations in 
Part 3 
No. of obs. 




















When comparing total donations in Parts 1 and 3, our main focus is not whether there is a 
revision for a given treatment but rather to see how the magnitude of revisions differs 
between treatments. A formal analysis of this comparison is presented in Table 5: total 
donations in Part 1 of all treatments significantly increase when subjects are given a chance 
to revise in Part 3. The biggest and most significant increase is observed in treatment SEQ-
NOINFO, while the increase in SIM is the smallest in magnitude compared to other 
treatments (and significant only at the 10% level). 
 
Table 5. Comparisons of donations in Part 1 and Part 3 












Median diff. 0 3 0 0 
p-value 0.058 0.000 0.067 0.022 
The p-values come from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. 
 
To make a statistical comparison between the magnitudes of the increases we observe in 
each treatment above, we use Mann-Whitney tests (not shown). We find that the increase 
  
in SEQ-NOINFO is significantly greater than the increase in SIM at the 1% level. A similar 
comparison reveals a significant difference between the increases in SEQ-NOINFO and 
the other treatments at 95% confidence level, whereas none of the remaining pairwise 
comparisons of the increases are significantly different from each other. 
 
Result 4. When subjects are given a chance to revise their donations, they increase their 
total donations in all treatments. The largest increase is observed in SEQ-NOINFO. 
 
According to Result 4 above, the largest revision in total donations is observed between 
Parts 1 and 3 of the SEQ-NOINFO treatment—consistent with the intuition that subjects 
are correcting their previous donation decisions when they were not fully informed. The 
differences in the amounts of revisions among collaborative (SIM) and independent (SEQ-
NOINFO) mechanisms stay statistically significant even when emotions are controlled for 
(see Column (3) of Table A.2). This strengthens our conclusion that informational 
differences among treatments are the main driver for the differences we observe among 
treatments. 
 
Given that subjects increase their total donations at different rates in all treatments, we now 
check whether revised total donations in treatments are still significantly different from 
each other. One would expect the gap between donations to disappear among the treatments 
once the informational differences disappear. Surprisingly, however, Table 6 shows that 
even after donations are revised, a difference in total donations at the 5% significance level 
still exists between treatments SIM and SEQ-NOINFO: revised total donations in SIM are 
significantly higher than those in SEQ-NOINFO as before. Moreover, comparing the 
revised total donations in Treatments SIM and SEQ-FULLINFO, which share the same 
information structure initially, reveals again no significant difference. OLS regressions also 






Table 6. Pairwise Comparisons of Total Donations in Treatments in Part 3 
 SEQ-NOINFO SEQ-LOWINFO SEQ-FULLINFO 
SIM 0.027 0.034 0.193 
SEQ-NOINFO  0.914 0.278 
SEQ-LOWINFO   0.257 
Each cell reports the p-value from a Mann-Whitney test. 
 
Table 7. OLS Regressions with and without control variables (for Part 3) 
Dep. Var : 
TotalDonationPart3 
(1) (2) 
sim 6.29* 7.20** 
 (3.30) (3.34) 
seq-lowinfo -0.48 -0.81 
 (3.35) (3.37) 
seq-fullinfo 3.5 4.62 
 (3.07) (3.61) 
constant 30.55*** 2.43 
 (2.26) (23.01) 
Controls added NO YES 
 187 187 
R2 0.03 0.28 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% 




Result 5. The difference in total donations between independent (SEQ-NOINFO) and 
collaborative (SIM) fundraising persists even when subjects are given a chance to revise 
their donations. More precisely, collaborative fundraising continues to attract significantly 
more total donations than independent fundraising even after revisions. 
 
  
One possible explanation for this persistent gap in total donations could be a reference 
effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Masatlioglu and Ok, 2005, 2014).23 Subjects might 
perceive their donations in Part 1 as a reference point and make revisions accordingly. 
Therefore, starting with a lower reference point, total donations in SEQ-NOINFO cannot 
reach the levels in SIM and as a result, while lower in magnitude, the gap remains.  
 
One might argue that independent fundraising would indeed do better in reality (as opposed 
to our Part 1 findings), as individuals always have a chance to update their decisions in real 
life by going back to the charities and making additional donations. By giving subjects the 
opportunity to change their donation decisions, Part 3 of our experiment takes this 
possibility into account. Therefore, this feature enriches our design and strengthens our 
real-life applications showing that collaborative fundraising still outperforms independent 
fundraising even when revisions are possible.24 
 
4.2 Does the Order of Requests Matter in Revising Donations to Individual Charities? 
 
Results from Section 4.1 show that, when given a second chance, subjects increase their 
total donations in all treatments with the largest increase observed in the SEQ-NOINFO 
treatment. We now analyze revisions in donations to individual charities.  
 
The horizontal axis in Figure 2 shows different donation requests (for each treatment) with 
one corresponding to the first donation request, two corresponding to the second donation 
request, etc. The vertical axis shows the mean revision in donations. Figure 2 also confirms 
that subjects in the SEQ-NOINFO treatment increase their overall donations more 
compared to the other treatments. Interestingly, the increase takes place mostly for the 
charities that were presented in later stages in Part 1. In other words, subjects in the SEQ-
NOINFO treatment also even out their donations, at least to some extent. While this 
suggests a possibility that the order of requests does not matter for donations in Part 3, 
                                                                
23 See Ericson and Fuster (2014) for an overview of reference dependence. 
24 It is possible that the reason we see reference dependence is due to some subjects trying to be consistent with their Part 
1 choices. These individuals might choose not to revise their donations. In fact, in real life donations, we also do not see 
individuals to make more than one donation to a given charity in a short period of time. Therefore, this alternative 
explanation would also imply a persistent gap between independent and collaborative fundraising techniques. 
  
when we perform an OLS regression analysis (not shown here), we find that the order effect 
in the SEQ-NOINFO treatment is still present at the 5% significance level. Nevertheless, 
the magnitude of this order effect is much smaller compared to that before revisions (the 
coefficient in front of order changes from -0.36 to -0.14). Similar to Part 1, we do not find 
statistically significant order effect of requests in any of the other treatments (p-values are 








In this paper, we focus on two fundraising mechanisms: independent fundraising where 
donation requests arrive sequentially with no information at all regarding forthcoming 
requests and collaborative fundraising where all donation requests arrive simultaneously. 
We experimentally compare performances of the two mechanisms in generating donations 
and find that collaborative fundraising outperforms independent fundraising. This result 
persists even when we control for emotions, ambiguity and risk attitudes as well as 
demographics. To understand the underlying reasons behind this difference, we introduce 
treatments where we vary the informational structure. We find that total donations do not 
  
change when partial information regarding the number of charities is provided, but 
significantly increase when full information regarding charities to send donation requests 
is provided to subjects before the sequential arrival of any requests. Moreover, there is no 
difference in total donations between collaborative fundraising and independent 
fundraising with full information. Hence, the lack of information in independent 
fundraising regarding the upcoming donation requests is likely the cause for its 
underperformance relative to the collaborative fundraising mechanism. In addition, we 
study whether early versus late arrival of solicitation requests matter. We show that the 
order of requests matter only in the independent fundraising, but when individuals are 
provided with information regarding the number of charities, this effect disappears. 
 
We interpret these results in the following way. The fact that we do not observe any 
difference in total donations between SEQ-NOINFO and SEQ-LOWINFO suggests that 
individuals might have a mental budget for charitable donations. While we see the same 
total donations between these two treatments, we also see a difference regarding how these 
donations are distributed across different solicitation requests. When individuals know how 
many solicitation requests they will receive, they allocate their donations evenly across 
requests. While individuals may have a mental budget for charitable giving, our additional 
treatments confirm that this budget does not need to be fixed. In both SEQ-NOINFO and 
SEQ-LOWINFO treatments, since individuals are not aware of the identities of the 
upcoming charities, they seem to save part of their charitable budget thinking that a “better” 
charity may show up later. This tendency does not exist in SEQ-FULLINFO and SIM 
treatments, and hence, total donations generated in these two treatments are higher. 
 
According to the additional novel feature our design offers, subjects receive a second 
chance to revise their initial donation decisions. Our findings reveal that total donations in 
all treatments increase when subjects are given a chance to update, but donations are 
updated the most in the independent fundraising scenarios. Nevertheless, collaborative 
fundraising still outperforms the independent one even after revisions. This suggests that 
earlier low donations in independent fundraising might be creating a reference point and 
  
individuals do not fully adjust their giving behavior even when they are offered a revision 
possibility. 
 
During the course of writing this paper, we became aware of a working paper that compares 
simultaneous and sequential fundraising (see Vance-McMullen (2017)). Both the 
methodology and the main focus of Vance-McMullen (2017) differ from ours. Vance-
McMullen conducts a survey experiment with Amazon Mechanical Turk participants and 
studies how independent and collaborative fundraising techniques affect donations to 
lesser-known charities relative to more well-known ones.25 In contrast, our paper provides 
a real donation laboratory experiment with all subjects making incentivized decisions. 
More importantly, we study the role of informational asymmetry in explaining the 
differences observed between these two mechanisms. 
 
Our results have important policy implications for the charitable sector. Competition 
through independent fundraising does not help individual charities. While early requests 
generate more funds relative to late requests under independent fundraising, we observe no 
evidence for early charities benefiting from independent fundraising relative to the case if 
they had instead participated in a simultaneous fundraising. Moreover, competition hurts 
the charitable sector as a whole (total donations are lower in independent fundraising 
relative to collaborative fundraising). That being said, we acknowledge that collaborative 
fundraising faces challenges. First, the success of collaborative fundraising depends on 
whether similar or dissimilar charities (in terms of their missions) are participating. Our 
experiment uses charities that do not share a common mission. If, instead, similar charities 
participate in collaborative fundraising, these charities could be judged as substitutes, and 
the impact of collaboration on donations could differ from that observed here. Our paper 
shows that collaborative fundraising with dissimilar charities improves donations, whereas 
Vance-McMullen (2017) does not find higher donations under collaborative fundraising 
when similar charities collaborate in fundraising. 26  Charities should take this into 
                                                                
25 In order to study this question, different from our paper, Vance-McMullen includes organizations with similar mission 
types. In particular, she uses four mission types in the broad areas of health and human services. Within each mission 
type, she selects three charities with identical causes. 
26 Vance-McMullen finds no significant differences in total donations between simultaneous and sequential fundraising 
techniques when similar charities participate, but less well-known charities perform worse under simultaneous donations. 
  
consideration while designing collaborative fundraising events as well as when deciding 
which fundraising techniques to use. Second, it is unrealistic to expect full collaboration, 
i.e., not all charities will participate in collaborative fundraising events. Therefore, at a 
given time, collaborative fundraising events may be accompanied by additional 
opportunities to give independently to other non-participating charities, and this may 
mitigate the effectiveness of collaboration. Our paper does not make any claim on the 
feasibility of full collaboration in reality. Concentrating on the two extreme scenarios of 
fully collaborative and fully independent mechanisms, this paper sheds light on how the 
attracted donations might be increased via additional participation by charities in 
collaborative fundraising efforts and provides a foundation upon which further lab or field 
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